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Spinning in Circles
In his well-reasoned paper, Professor 
Wagstaff revisits the definition of hypnosis, 
on which we have been spinning in circles 
for more than a century, getting not much 
further than a hamster in a cage (see also 
Kirsch et al., 2011).  A problem throughout 
has been the attempt to trap the complex 
phenomenon of hypnosis within a single, 
preferred theoretical framework, and the 
general dictionaries have been of no help 
whatsoever.  They have either provided state-
ments that are uninformed (e.g., hypnosis 
as loss of voluntary action, or a state resem-
bling sleep) or so vague that they are useless 
(access to “deeper parts of the mind”).  The 
definitions provided by professional orga-
nizations (disclaimer: I participated in the 
development of the 1993 definition by the 
Society of Psychological Hypnosis) are bet-
ter informed but often fail, as per Wagstaff’s 
analysis, to recognize an essential aspect of 
hypnosis, namely that its concept assumes 
changes in the state of consciousness, wheth-
er they happen or not.  Instead of that, for 
instance, the 2003 definition of the Society 
of Hypnosis declares that “the subject is told 
that suggestions for imaginative experiences 
will be presented,” which is inaccurate in 
a number of ways.  First is the issue of the 
term  “subject,” which in the current, non-
philosophical usage implies that the person 
is passive.  Research from psychological and 
neuroscientific perspectives shows quite 
convincingly that participants are actively 
engaged during the hypnotic process (Lynn 
& Sivec, 1992; McGeown, Mazzoni, Venneri, 
& Kirsch, 2009).  Relatedly, terms such as 
“being hypnotized” falsely imply that some-
thing is done unto a passive being.
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Another problem with the 2003 defini-
tion is that many inductions, and certainly 
those used in hypnotizability testing, do not 
involve telling people that they will be ex-
posed to imaginative suggestions.  Rather, 
what is repeated throughout is that the 
person will go into the undefined state of 
“hypnosis.” And here we get into the crux of 
Wagstaff’s argument because for most peo-
ple in our culture using the term hypnosis 
implies that the person will experience al-
terations in consciousness, and most people 
adopt consequently a particular behavioral 
and psychological set.  This aspect of hyp-
nosis has been essential in some multidi-
mensional models of hypnosis.  In the com-
prehensive, but these days mostly forgotten, 
model of Shor (1962), hypnosis has three 
dimensions: depth of role taking, depth of 
trance, and archaic involvement.  The first 
dimension alludes to the meaning that the 
term hypnosis and related social events (e.g., 
changes in the hypnotist’s voice) have for the 
typical participant (cf. Kihlstrom, 1985).  The 
hypnotic context provides a set of explicit 
and implicit rules for how people should 
behave (e.g., not interacting with others or 
asking questions during the procedure), and 
an interpretative framework for consequent 
behaviors and experiences.  The model of 
Brown and Fromm (1986) also describes so-
ciocultural (or sociocognitive, if you will) 
and other aspects of hypnosis along three 
dimensions: expectation and suggestibility, 
alterations in consciousness (trance), and the 
special hypnotic relationship. 
This does not mean, however, that us-
ing the label of hypnosis, and the associated 
expectations it engenders, is all there is to 
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hypnotic inductions, which tend to be simi-
lar in what they convey and what they avoid 
stating.  Regarding the latter point, in my 
decades of acquaintanceship with all kinds 
of inductions, I have yet to come across with 
any that declares something along the lines of 
“the more your mind jumps from one thing 
to another, as it usually does, the more hypno-
tized you will become.” Barber and Calverley 
(1965, in Barber, 1969) found that participants 
experienced themselves as being more hyp-
notized if besides using the label of hypnosis 
they also received suggestions for relaxation 
and sleep.  Although they did not find that the 
length of those suggestions made any differ-
ence, Klinger (1970) reported markedly higher 
(although not significantly so, probably be-
cause of low statistical power) objective and 
subjective hypnotizability scores following 
a 10-minute induction than a 1-minute one. 
This was also my experience when I informal-
ly asked a group of high hypnotizables (HHs) 
exposed to two different types of hypnotiz-
ability testing, one induction being consider-
ably shorter than the other.  They uniformly 
mentioned feeling more hypnotized with the 
longer procedure.  Transitions between states 
of consciousness or, at the very least, between 
mental sets, may require some time (Tart, 
1975).  Nonetheless, there seems to be a ceiling-
effect because even HHs who spontaneously 
reported increasingly deep and unusual con-
scious alterations during a “neutral hypnosis” 
procedure reached an asymptote of experi-
enced depth after some minutes (Cardeña, 
2005), as did low and medium hypnotizables, 
although at lower levels (Cardeña, Jönsson, 
Terhune, & Marcusson-Clavertz, 2013).  But 
not only relaxation-sleep suggestions seem to 
positively interact with the label of hypnosis, 
because physical activity paired to a focus on 
mental alertness produces similar results to a 
relaxation induction (Bányai & Hilgard, 1976; 
Cardeña, Alarcón, Capafons, & Bayot, 1998).  
So, are there common factors in  hypnotic 
inductions, besides using the label, that help 
evoke changes in the state of consciousness? 
Here I will follow Barber’s notion (1984) that 
an induction helps the person disregard extra-
neous concerns (such as plans for the imme-
diate future and current worries) and focus on 
the hypnotist’s suggestions or on what occurs 
spontaneously.  Furthermore, inductions seek 
to produce an experiential rather than a con-
ceptual mental set (cf. Tellegen, 1981), and a 
continuous form of attention to experience 
is a form of mentation that differs from the 
typically short and variegated mental occur-
rences of everyday life (Cardeña & Spiegel, 
1991; Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010).  Thus, 
a hypnotic induction fosters expectations for 
alterations in consciousness and facilitates 
such changes, independently of whether ev-
eryone does experience them (lows usually 
do not; Cardeña et al., 2013). Hypnotic induc-
tions, as do other procedures such as medita-
tive techniques, interact with individual dif-
ferences in the propensity to have absorptive, 
self-transcendence, and other alterations of 
consciousness independent of the hypnotic 
context (Cardeña & Terhune, 2014).  
One final point I want to discuss related to 
Wagstaff’s paper is whether hypnotic experi-
ences are similar to those in other contexts.  I 
believe that it is a mistake to invoke the concept 
of “trance,” which is so vague as to be close to 
useless, but one can nonetheless compare be-
havioral, cognitive, and experiential changes 
that occur in hypnosis with those occurring 
in other situations.  Two contexts have been 
often associated with hypnosis: some cultur-
ally accepted rituals and reactions to trau-
matic events.  A variety of rituals use differ-
ent techniques (besides the expectations and 
interpretations elicited by the ritual space and 
time) such as rhythmic music, darkness, and 
story telling, to make the person disregard ex-
traneous concerns and everyday worries and 
focus instead on the ongoing ritual (Cardeña 
& Krippner, 2010).  Traumatic events can also 
produce a focusing (and narrowing) of at-
tention (Cardeña & Spiegel, 1993), although 
within an anxiety-eliciting event.  Some of 
the resulting phenomenology, including ex-
periences of automaticity and phenomenal 
changes in the senses of time, the body, and 
so on, are common to all three contexts.  The 
overlap, however, is not complete since each 
situation has unique features and is embed-
ded within varying cultural interpretations of 
the event.  To curtail conceptual spinning, we 
must keep in mind the complex sociocultural, 
cognitive, emotional, and noetic characteris-
tics of hypnosis.
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